Between angels and beasts. Augustine’s rehabilitation of the<i> Civitas Peregrina </i>through an alternative reading of the <i>City of God</i> by Genghini, Maria Giulia
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
King’s Research Portal 
 
Document Version
Peer reviewed version
Link to publication record in King's Research Portal
Citation for published version (APA):
Genghini, M. G. (Accepted/In press). Between angels and beasts. Augustine’s rehabilitation of the Civitas
Peregrina through an alternative reading of the City of God. Augustinianum, 60(1).
Citing this paper
Please note that where the full-text provided on King's Research Portal is the Author Accepted Manuscript or Post-Print version this may
differ from the final Published version. If citing, it is advised that you check and use the publisher's definitive version for pagination,
volume/issue, and date of publication details. And where the final published version is provided on the Research Portal, if citing you are
again advised to check the publisher's website for any subsequent corrections.
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the Research Portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright
owners and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognize and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
•Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the Research Portal for the purpose of private study or research.
•You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
•You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the Research Portal
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact librarypure@kcl.ac.uk providing details, and we will remove access to
the work immediately and investigate your claim.
Download date: 08. Sep. 2020
 1 
BETWEEN ANGELS AND BEASTS. 
AUGUSTINE’S REHABILITATION OF THE CIVITAS PEREGRINA 
THROUGH AN ALTERNATIVE READING OF THE CITY OF GOD.  
 
1. Introduction. 
In the beginning of the City of God (413-427 AD), Augustine makes his task to 
defend «the glorious City of God against those who prefer their own gods to the 
Founder of that City».1 From the very outset of the treatise, discussion of the “earthly 
city” appears subordinate and ancillary to discussion of the “city of God”. Yet a closer 
reading of Augustine’s metaphysics of conversion, as presented in books XII, XIV, and 
XIX of the City of God, reveals an overturning of this initial perspective.  
In book XII Augustine reflects over the creation of man as the origin of the two 
cities, the earthly and the divine, each one arising according to the enactment of a good 
or evil will. Drawing an analogy between the condition of man and that of the angels in 
heaven, Augustine suggests that the two groups represent a perfect mirror of the human 
condition: as created beings, both have the power to cling onto or to refuse the original 
dependence from the Creator according to the freedom of their will, by which they will 
either enjoy immortality or live like beasts by means of pride and disobedience. 
If, for ancient philosophy, a commonwealth of people is “an association of men 
united by a common sense of right” where “justice is the virtue that assigns everyone 
his due,”2 in the City of God Augustine explores how this common sense comes to be 
 
1 Aug., civ. Dei 1, 1 (CCSL 47, 1). All translations in this paper are taken from St. Augustine, City of 
God, translated by Henry Bettenson, London 1972 (Penguin Books). See also the brief commentary on 
the civ. Dei by Gerard O’Daly, Augustine’s City of God: A Reader’s Guide, Oxford 1999 (Oxford 
Clarendon Press).   
2 Cic., De Rep. 2, 42 (ed. J. Zetsel, Cambridge University Press, 1999); Arist., Eth. Nic. 5, 5, 2 Oxford 
2009 (Oxford World Classics, Oxford University Press). Cf. Aug., civ. Dei 2, 21 (CCSL 47, 55). 
 2 
necessarily bound to the multitude’s “agreement on the objects of their love.”3 The 
acceptance of the relation between man and his transcendental origin, incarnated in the 
bonds of history, places the service of God as the object of man’s love. The rejection of 
it affirms the loving of the self, carried as far as the contempt of God.4 Perfecting 
notions already explored and revisited in previous philosophical works, such as De 
libero arbitrio (387-391 AD) and De gratia et libero arbitrio (426 AD),5 Augustine 
brings to maturity his theological thought on grace and free will by discussing their 
social and political impact on the creation of a just society on earth.  
Analyzing the moral character of the ancient Romans, Augustine depicts them 
as driven by a great passion for glory, which, however, was soon transformed into a 
greed for praise.6 From his observations, Augustine concludes that man always 
establishes a source of authority, which governs his choices, this guide being either 
God or any other sort of spiritual or material drive. If choice is voluntary and no 
efficient cause is found to direct human will to sources other than God, man has the 
power to decide whether to cooperate to the realization of the city of God on earth or to 
 
3 Aug., civ. Dei 19, 24 (CCSL 48, 695). 
4 Cf. Aug., civ. Dei 12,23 (CCSL 48, 384). See also civ. Dei 12, 28 (CCSL 48, 384, lines 6-12) where 
Augustine discusses human nature in this way: «For the human race is, more than any other species, at 
once social by nature and quarrelsome by perversion».  
5 In De libero arbitrio, Augustine argues that there exists an unavoidable tension between the perversion 
of the will which makes inferior things the object of its love, thus causing the separation from the truth, 
and Truth itself which, while constituting man’s happiness, transcends him, belongs to none, and thus can 
only be begged for (2.11.31). However, at the end of his discussion, Augustine still maintains that the 
mind becomes slave of sinful desire only by its own will, since it would be impossible for such shameful 
condition to be induced either by something superior or equal, in which case it would be contrary to the 
principle of justice, or by anything beneath it, in which instance it would be impossible (3.1.2). Thus, the 
possession of wisdom resides entirely in the enactment of a good will. (1.12.25: Voluntas qua appetimus 
recte honesteque vivere, et ad summam sapientiam pervenire). In De gratia et libero arbitrio, Augustine 
amends his previous statements by affirming that our good life can only be possible as a state of grace 
that already precedes the very same disposition of the will through which it is perfected 13.25). In this 
light, Christ did not simply come to assist us in our conversion, but he first came to restore our human 
nature to justify it, as Pauline terminology would say, where both the Law of the Old Testament and the 
Neoplatonist idea about the nature of the soul could not. That nature of ours, lost in Adam, has been 
restored by the One who came ‘to seek and to save what was lost.’ (Lc. 19.10).  
6 Cf. Aug., civ. Dei 5 (CCSL 47). For a detailed discussion of the primordial sin of the Roman Empire, 
which wished to hear the account of God’s mercy, and yet perverted the worship of God to its own glory 
or self-worship, see J. Cavadini, Ideology and Solidarity in Augustine’s City of God, in Augustine’s City 
of God: A Critical Guide, ed. James Wetzel, Cambridge 2012 (Cambridge University Press), 92-110. 
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give rise to societies driven by earthly forces, which deprive man of the awareness of 
his transcendental origin and redemptive promise.7  
This Augustinian view overturns the interpretation of the City of God as 
primarily a work of sacred history. Augustine extends his discussion on existential 
categories, such as free will and grace, beyond the realm of philosophical and 
theological debate and investigates here their impact on the historical process. In this 
light, the focus of my analysis lies on the apparent displacement of the life of the two 
cities exclusively into the realm of man’s inner world. I argue that a clear-cut 
separation between man’s spiritual life and its social and public dimension does not 
justify a comprehensive reading of the City of God. In support of my thesis, I point the 
attention to the paradoxical conclusions that scholars have reached on Augustine’s 
work when informed by this dichotomist view, and make use of Augustine’s own text 
to show the social implications of Christian revelation. In communion with the Holy 
Church, by which man can partake in the divine life of Christ, those who are inhabitant 
of the earthly city can choose to form a society of men driven by the willingness to 
serve the city of God.   
 
2.  The City of God in the eyes of modern critic  
The scholarship produced over the City of God cannot be unified under a 
coherent view on themes like politics and social justice. This is partly due to the 
conversionary character of the Augustinian narrative, which, as Benedict XVI 
underlines8, is always defined by a process of self-correction that enriches and 
articulates its view.  
 
7 Cf. Aug., civ. Dei 12, 6 (CCSL 48) 
8 L. Coco, ed., I Santi di Benedetto XVI, Città del Vaticano, 2008 (Libreria Editrice Vaticana). 
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American humanism has no hesitation in denouncing Augustine for his 
inadmissible vision of the historical process. 
 
The attempt to derive theological-ethical values from history begins with Augustine…but, 
without doing injustice to his powerful intellect, we may safely say that the attempt to make the 
facts of history prove the truth or validity of Christian ethics is convincing only to those who are 
determined to be convinced beforehand.9    
 
This pragmatic view, which denies any transcendental claims of reason in the 
knowledge of truth, has led scholarship of the 1970s-1980s to consider the City of God 
as primarily a masterpiece of sacred history, where the establishment of the Christian 
Empire and the repression of paganism have become part of God’s saving work and are 
described in the categories of biblical prophecies.10 For these scholars, it exists an 
unsolvable tension between contemporary history and tempora christiana and they 
view Augustine’s discussion in the City of God dealing «not with anything that could 
be called an institution, but rather with persons and processes».11 The Augustinian 
division of the human race into two genera – angels and beasts – comes to be explained 
in light of this ‘atomistic personalism’: on the one hand,  «the crowds of the impious 
who bear the image of the earthly man», and on the other, «the succession of men 
dedicated to the one God».12 The implication of such view is that the civitas dei carries 
forward a subversion of the public on behalf of a community of people more and less 
marginalized by their refusal of Roman imperial authority and thus capable of 
“replacing the world” with a bond between persons held together by a special form of 
 
9 M. Cohen, Reason and Nature, New York 1978 (Harcourt, Brace and. Company), 377.  
10 R. Markus, Saeculum, History and Society in the Theology of St. Augustine, Cambridge 1970 
(Cambridge University Press), 31.  
11 R. Williams, Politics and the Soul: A Reading of the City of God, in Milltown Studies 55 (1987), 55-72, 
there 57; see also Markus, Saeculum, 149-152.  
12 Cf. Aug., De vera rel., 27,50 (CCSL 32, 235).  
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love (caritas): «The bond of charity between people, while it is incapable of founding a 
public realm of its own…is admirably fit to carry a group of essentially wordless 
people through the world».13 No identification of either of the two cities with any 
institution or with any empirically definable body of people can be reconciled with the 
radical dichotomy outlined by Augustine’s theology of the two loves.14 The distinction 
between the two cities lies, in fact, in the dimension of men’s wills, in their inner 
response to their world and their experience. The theme of the “order of love”, which 
runs through the City of God,15 is thus associated with the inner battle of an individual’s 
evaluation between the ‘enjoyment’ (frui) of things for their own sake or their ‘use’ 
(uti) for the sake of something else.16 In this sense, «the De civitate is not at all a work 
of political theory in the usual sense, but sketches for a theological anthropology and a 
corporate spirituality».17 Augustine’s redefinition of the Ciceronian concept of populus 
(iuris consensus et utilitatis communione)18 into a commonwealth of people united by 
the object of their love (quando quidem Deo non serviens nullo modo potest iuste 
animus corpori aut humana ratio vitiis imperare)19 is viewed as the reestablishment of 
the correct ordo where the material interest (politics) is subordinated to the sovereignty 
of the spiritual (the soul).20 The purpose of man under God’s order is to restore the 
rebellious wills of human beings to some approximation of the divine ordo, which is 
also the right ordering of our internal lives, the dominance of soul over body, reason 
 
13 H. Arendt, The Human Condition, Chicago 1958 (University of Chicago Press), 53. 
14 C. Cochrane, Christianity and Classical Culture, New York 1957 (New York University Press), 397.  
15 Books 15-17 describe the intertwined course of the two cities. In civ. Dei 15.2 Augustine interprets the 
allegory of the women from Gal. 4.21-5.1 as a reference to the two cities, while in civ. Dei 15, 22 the city 
of God is called “Christ’s Bride” (sponsa Christi [CCSL 48, 488]). For a fuller discussion on the course 
of the two cities, in particular on book 18 and the showing up of the earthly city by contrast with its 
opposite, see J. Cavadini, Spousal Vision: A Study of text and History in the Theology of Saint Augustine, 
in Augustinian Studies 43:1/2 (2012), 127-148.  
16 Aug., De doctr. Christ. 1, 27, 28 (CCSL 32, 28-29). 
17 Williams, Politics and the Soul, 58. 
18 Aug., civ. Dei 2, 21 (CCSL 47, 55). 
19 Aug., civ. Dei 19, 21 (CCSL 48, 347).  
20 J.D. Adams, The populus of Augustine and Jerome: a study in the patristic sense of community (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1971), 18-22. 
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over passion. The Ciceronian saying imperant enim qui consulunt21 becomes an 
imperative for spiritual nurturing where the natural order of family life is the primary 
locus for the exercise of such office: the household and the society become a 
“laboratory of the spirit” whose policy is not determined by considerations of worldly 
triumph.22  
In light of this, Hannah Arendt makes Augustine the great enemy of the public 
realm.23 Other scholars might not be so radical in the judgement; however, they insist in 
pointing out the internal dimension of Augustine’s speech over the two cities.24 To their 
observation, the life of the two cities is inextricably linked to the fundamental issue of 
what it is to be a creature animated by desire, whose prominent features are lack and 
hunger caused by a central and unforgettable absence. On such basis, there is no 
possibility of building a theory that would allow final security and ‘finishedness’ to any 
form of political life.25 
This spiritual reading of the City of God terminates into a dichotomist view, 
which incorporates the historical approach into an exclusive eschatological narrative. 
On the one hand, the City of God is described as a revelation, «an apocalypse of the 
imagination, an imaginary unveiling of what will be in the end without end».26 
Augustine is seen as claiming to lift the mysterious veil of human history to pierce 
 
21 Aug., civ. Dei 19, 14. 
22 Williams, Politics and the Soul, 62-65. 
23 A. Arendt, The Human Condition, Chicago 1998 (Chicago University Press), 53: «This surprising 
illustration of the Christian political principle is in fact very well chosen, because the bond of charity 
between people, while it is incapable of founding a public realm of its own, is quite adequate to the main 
Christian principle of worldlessness and is admirably fit to carry a group of essentially worldless people 
through the world, a group of saints or a group of criminals, provided only it is understood that the world 
itself is doomed and that every activity in it is undertaken with the proviso quamdiu mundus durat (“as 
long as the world lasts”)».  
24 Cf. J. M. Parrish, Two Cities and Two Loves: Imitation in Augustine’s Moral Psychology and Political 
Theory, in History of Political Thought, vol. 26, n. 2 (Summer 2005), 209-235. For a discussion of 
modern applications on Augustine’s view of the history and life of the two cities, cf. R. C. Crouse 
Augustine and a ‘Christendom’ Two Cities, in Two Kingdoms & Two Cities: Mapping Theological 
Traditions of Church, Culture, and Civil Order, ed. R. C. Crouse, Minneapolis 2017, 149–178.  
25 Williams, Politics and the Soul, 69. 
26 H. Maier, The end of the City and the City without end: the City of God as Revelation, in Augustinian 
Studies 30:2 (1999), 153-164, there 155.  
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through its bewildering opacity. History is a web of signification awaiting unveiling as 
the one with illumined eyes teases out its true meaning in all its spiritual richness.27 In 
this kind of reading, the final three books (XX-XXII) reflect topically the narrative 
sequence of Revelation from chapter 18 to 22 (the identification of the two Babylon; 
the millennium; judgment and resurrection of the body; descent of the heavenly 
Jerusalem; life in the city and the beatific vision). Here Augustine is said to unveil the 
nature of the beatific vision of the saints in eternal felicity through the paradoxical 
telling of what cannot be told (“the end, without end” of 20,30). Thus, in the City of 
God, even the present «happiness is always a question of endings, an orientation 
toward final goods whether they be of the self or of God».28  
On the other hand, it cannot be ignored that Augustine’s narrative is widely 
informed by Cicero’s use of Roman history, especially when he attempts to 
demythologize imperial ideology and eliminate the argument that it was Rome’s gods 
who made Rome great and the Roman neglect of its own tradition in favour of new 
religions, such as Christianity, which caused its fall.29 To conciliate the use of Roman 
historical categories with the Christian eschatological perspective, the critic sees the 
City of God as an attempt to synchronize non-biblical history with biblical events. Book 
XVIII is taken as reference to demonstrate that  
 
the scope of history in the City of God extends from the creation in book XI to the final judgment 
and the end of history in the final book of the work. Within this panorama, earthly kingdoms 
have a limited life span.30  
 
 
27 Cf. Aug., civ. Dei 16, 1-2; 17, 3; 20, 21. 
28 Maier, City of God as Revelation, 161. Cfr. civ. Dei 8, 3; 10, 1; 19, 1.  
29 Cf. Aug., civ. Dei 5, 12-19 (CCSL 47, 130)  
30 G. O’Daly, Thinking through History: Augustine’s Method in the City of God and its Ciceronian 
Dimension, in Augustinian Studies 30:2 (1999), 45-57, there 55.  
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This view takes Augustine’s words on the establishment of Rome’s power and 
Empire as perfectly fitting the modern discourse about the Christianization of the 
Roman Empire, begun in the fourth century.31    
 
It was God’s design to conquer the world through her, to unite the world into the single 
community of the Roman commonwealth and the Roman laws, and so to impose peace 
throughout its length and breadth.32  
 
In this light, the historical character of the Augustinian narrative is inevitably 
linked to the wider eschatological scope expressed by the first view, which thus 
eliminates any trace of social or political autonomy from Augustine’s ecclesiological 
discourse.  
 
The church proceeds on its pilgrim way in this world, in these evil days, not merely since the 
time of the bodily presence of Christ and of his apostles; it started with Abel himself, the first 
righteous man slain by an ungodly brother; and the pilgrimage goes on from that time right up to 
the end of history, with the persecutions of the world on one side, and on the other consolations 
of God.33 
 
Yet, some scattered voices have pointed to the danger represented by such 
dichotomist views of history, as they contribute to the separation between individuals 
and morality and make the task of building up the earthly city through justice a utopian 
try of man’s will. 
 
 
31 R. McMullen, Christianizing the Roman Empire, New Haven and London, 1984 (Yale University 
Press). 
32 Aug., civ. Dei 18, 22 (CCSL 48, 619).  
33 Aug, civ. Dei 18, 51 (CCSL 48, 649). 
 9 
We cannot ignore the fact that some currents of modern culture, built upon rationalist and 
individualist economic principles, have cut off the concept of justice from its transcendent roots, 
detaching it from charity and solidarity: the ‘earthly city’ is promoted not merely by relationships 
of rights and duties, but to an even greater and more fundamental extent by relationships of 
gratuitousness, mercy and communion. Charity always manifests God’s love in human 
relationships as well, it gives theological and salvific value to all commitment for justice in the 
world.34 
 
What is then Augustine’s position before this argued separation? 
 
3.  The fellowship of man with good or evil angels.  
Book XII is situated in what scholars have identified as the second movement of 
Augustine’s plan. 35 After devoting the first 10 books to the refutation that the Christian 
religion has brought about the disaster of the Roman Empire and the display of the 
superstitious beliefs spread around the city («we have replied to the enemies of this holy 
city in the previous ten books»,36) Augustine can now proceed to discuss the origin 
(books XI-XIV), the history (XV-XVIII) and the final destinations of the two cities, the 
earthly and the divine (XIX-XXII).  
At the outset of book XII, Augustine reflects over the creation of man as the 
origin of the two cities and he draws a parallel with the origin and the nature of good 
and bad angels in the hope of demonstrating «that there is no absurdity or incongruity 
in asserting a fellowship between men and angels».37 In the behaviour of these angels, 
in fact, we can reflect the same perversion of the will which determines man's 
character, with the good angels «persisting resolutely in that Good which is common to 
 
34 Benedict XVI, Message for World day of Peace 2012 
http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/benedict_xvi/messages/peace/documents/hf_ben-
xvi_mes_20111208_xlv-world-day-peace_en.html, point 5.  
35 O’Daly, Augustine’s City of God, 146-147. 
36 Aug., civ Dei 9,1 (CCSL 47, 247).  
37 Aug., civ Dei 12, 1 (CCSL 48, 299).  
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all – which for them is God himself – and his eternity, truth, and love, while the others 
delighted rather with their own power, as though they themselves were their own 
Good».38 The discourse about angels had begun in book XI where Augustine explained 
that they were created and given illumination «so as to live in wisdom and bliss».39 
Some of them, however, turned away from this illumination renouncing to the 
excellence of a life of wisdom and bliss, maintaining only a life of reason, which they 
cannot lose because of their immortality. The stress is on the fact that the angels who 
fought the authority of God did so not by nature but by the contrariety of the will, 
which led them to choose «pride in their own elevation in exchange for the true 
exaltation of eternity».40 According to Augustine, also men, as created beings, have the 
power to cling onto or to refuse the original dependence from the Creator according to 
the freedom of their will, which has no power to offend God, but in so far as it turns 
men away from Him, their source of being, it violets their own true nature.  
The only difference between holy angels and godly men lies in the form of 
knowledge that the two groups can attain once they choose to submit their life to God. 
The good angels, in fact, «do not learn about God by spoken words, but by the actual 
presence of the unchanging Truth, that is by his only-begotten Word, by the Father 
himself, and by his Holy Spirit».41 This perfect knowledge is a God-given gift to the 
minds of those who are already in the contemplation of God and, for this reason, it is a 
knowledge founded on a degree of certainty greater than any human understanding. 
However, Augustine places great emphasis on the relation between angels and men, 
who are united by the same freedom of will, even though distinct in their possibility of 
the knowledge of truth.  
 
38 Aug., civ Dei 12, 1 (CCSL 48, 299). 
39 Aug., civ Dei 11, 11 (CCSL 48, 360) 
40 Aug., civ Dei 12,1 (CCSL 48, 299). 
41 Aug., civ Dei 11, 29 (CCSL 48).  
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In order to exemplify the way in which will is absent from any necessary cause 
to evil, Augustine provides the case of two men, of similar disposition in mind and 
body, who see the beauty of a woman’s body. One yields and consents to it, while the 
other steadfastly remains still in his disposition as he had been before the vision. The 
same beauty was seen by the eyes of both men alike, the difference lies solely in their 
consent, the evil choice for which we try in vein to find the efficient cause.42  
 
The truth is that one should not try to find an efficient cause for a wrong choice. It is not a matter 
of efficiency, but of deficiency; the evil will itself is not effective but defective.43 
 
If failure to good is voluntary, existential categories such as freedom of will, 
mutability of the spirits, and possibility of redemption escape spiritual and 
philosophical confinement, and are here deployed to show their historical and social 
implications. Augustine’s theological discourse on social justice takes the form of a 
sermon, addressing real interlocutors, rather than that of a treatise, which focuses solely 
on man’s inner disposition.  
By preferring themselves to God, bad man and bad angels preferred that which 
has less being and so they show that  
 
any good will would have been impoverished, remaining in the state of longing, had it not been 
that he who made, out of nothing, a nature that was good and capable of enjoying Him, made it 
better by fulfilling that desire, first having excited it to greater eagerness for that fulfilment.44  
 
Augustine fosters a conception of being as a degree of association and 
incorporation in the sacrifice of praise to the only one supreme and perfect being, God, 
 
42 Cf. Aug., civ. Dei 12, 6 (CCSL 48) 
43 Aug., civ Dei 12, 7 (CCSL 48) 
44 Aug., civ Dei 12, 9 (CCSL 48, 
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by means of the configuration of man’s will to the Creator’s activity. The more a man 
is aware of himself and his longing for the Creator, the more his act of praise fulfils 
him and gives him being. Therefore, man’s nature stands amidst that of the good 
angels, on one side, and of beasts, on the other, and takes its definitive state through the 
enactment of a good will, by which one submit himself to his Creator,  
 
as to his true sovereign Lord, and observing his instructions with dutiful obedience, he should 
pass over into the fellowship of the angels, attaining an immortality of endless felicity, without 
an intervening death, 
 
or living like a beast by means of pride and disobedience so that he «should be the slave 
of his desires, and destined after death for eternal punishment».45  
While the battlefield for a correct application of the will is each man’s soul, the 
outcome of each individual battle bears consequences on the way men interact with one 
another. The multitude’s agreement on a common object of love reveals, in fact, that 
men form societies not simply on the basis of their similar nature (naturae similitudine), 
but more deeply on their feeling of kingship (cognationis affectu).46  
 
God foresaw that by his grace a community of godly men was to be called to adoption as his 
sons,47 and these men, with their sins forgiven, were to be justified by the Holy Spirit and then to 
enter into fellowship with the holy angels in eternal peace.48  
 
In alignment with God’s plan for mankind, the City of God is, thus, a narrative 
about ‘glory’, but one that projects the overweening love of praise of the Romans into 
 
45 Aug., civ Dei 12, 22 (CCSL 48, 380).  
46 Aug., civ Dei 12, 22 (CCSL 48, 380).  
47 Cf. Rom. 8,15; Gal. 4,5. 
48 Aug., civ Dei 12, 23.  
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the glorious city of God.49 In this way, it redeems Roman depravity and corruption, by 
re-establishing a secure path to glory, which accumulation of wealth and robbery 
towards the less fortunate had ruined. Augustine refers Sallust’s words, which describe 
this spiritual fall:   
 
It was, at first, ambition rather than greed that worked on man’s heart; a vice closer to a virtue. 
The true man and the worthless wretch alike covet glory, honour and power. But the true man 
directs his efforts along the right way; the man who lacks the moral qualities works towards his 
goal by trickery and deceit.50 
 
The discussion on the transformation of the moral qualities of the Romans into 
wickedness, highlighted in Book V of the City of God, places Augustine’s analysis onto 
an existential level that refers to the Romans as a symbol of the human race, engaged in 
a constant struggle (conversio) towards a definitive guiding principle. «Men need 
authority: they need to be shaken from their habits and irrational tendencies, by a firm, 
persuasive challenge from above».51 If guidance does not come from God, it will come 
from another source.52  
Augustine here establishes the character of a civitas peregrina which «is not 
only a narrative of another empire, a holy one, but a narrative of freedom emerging 
from the captivity of empire».53 This earthly city represents the concrete realization of 
Cicero’s noble definition on the essence of the Roman commonwealth.54 According to 
this reading, Augustine sees the journey of the new civitas peregrina developing from 
 
49 P. Brown, Augustine of Hippo: a biography, Berkeley 1967 (University of California Press), 311. 
50 Sall., Cat. 11,1 in Aug. civ Dei 5,12:  «Hence these men of base character, who abounded when Sallust 
wrote and Virgil sang these things, did not seek after honours and glory by these arts, but by treachery 
and deceit». 
51 Aug., Ep.137, 3, 12 and 138, 3, 17. 
52 Brown, Augustine of Hippo, 311. 
53 Cavadini, Spousal Vision, 27-28. 
54 Cf. Aug., civ. Dei 2, 21. 
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history to the city of God; therefore, as a parable that begins in the ‘here and now’. 
Such journey is not merely a spiritual one, it includes a real battle for the liberation of 
man from any material or worldly ideology, and attends the redemptive promise, which 
Augustine thus summarises:  
 
We also must know first our captivity, then our liberation: we must know Babylon and 
Jerusalem…These two cities, as a matter of historical fact, were two cities recorded in the 
Bible…They were founded, at precise moments, to crystallize in symbolic form, the reality of 
these two ‘cities’ that had begun in the remote past, and that will continue to the end of the 
world.55  
 
The possibility of becoming citizens of the heavenly Jerusalem on earth is open 
to all men as their election to become part of this particular civitas peregrina does not 
depend on their ‘similarity of nature’, but rather on the way each one distinctively 
chooses to enact his will (‘affection of kingship’). It is, therefore, the yearning of the 
will for the city of God, which guarantees one’s own election to it.  
 
Now let us hear, brothers, let us hear and sing; let us pine for the City where we are 
citizens. By pining, we are already there; we have already cast our hope, like an anchor, on that 
coast. I sing of somewhere else, not of here: for I sing with my heart, not with my flesh. The 
citizens of Babylon hear the sound of the flesh, the Founder of Jerusalem hears the tune of our 
heart.56 
  
Augustine’s treatment of the citizens of the heavenly Jerusalem echoes Sallust’s 
identification of the true man who lives out his ambition for glory in light of the way of 
 
55 Aug., Enarr. in Ps. 64, 1 and 2. For a discussion of the confusion that reigned in “Babylon” as a 
figurative image of the vulnerability of mankind, see Cavadini, Spousal Vision, 17-18. See also, M. 
Cameron, Transfiguration: Christology and the Roots of Figurative Exegesis in St. Augustine, in Studia 
Patristica 33, ed. E. A. Livingstone, Leuven 1997, 40-47.   
56 Aug., Enarr. in Ps. 64, 3. 
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merit.57 By connecting the Christian and the Roman ideal of the quest for true glory, 
Augustine seems to forge a universal call to social justice, by which any man, not just 
Christians, is invited to partake in the nature of this noble and everlasting city. The 
presence of a communal yearning among individuals of different worlds implies that 
man’s heart longs for an experience of eternity, which has been sown in each human 
life, as it would be ontologically impossible to yearn for something, which does not 
exist. This introduces a love for the plagues of human existence that Augustine 
expresses in his commentary on the Psalms, where he exhorts to sing “serenades”, ad 
amatoria quaedam cantica,58 playing not on fear, but on love for a distant though 
existing country: the ancient city of God. 
It is the reality of the city of God on earth that pushes Augustine to tackle 
ancient and modern dichotomist views about the relation between history and 
eschatology. The Platonist fundamental separation between the materiality and the 
immutability of existence led them to deny the divinity of Christ, as it was impossible 
to conceive the union of this radical dichotomy in the life of Jesus Christ. As Plato once 
held that lesser gods were the makers of the other living beings, being impossible for 
God himself to mingle with mortal forms of existence, so too Porphyry believed that 
the soul had to escape any form of bodily attraction to achieve purification.59  
Refuting such statements, Augustine asks: «if our creation, although we were 
made mortals, is the gift of God, how can it be a punishment to return to bodies which 
are God’s blessings»?60  By revisiting the Plotinian sense of wonder at the sight of 
creation,61 Augustine reforms his language to speak of mankind as a marvel of unity 
within plurality. A multitude has, in fact, been created from one individual and this is 
 
57 Sall., Cat.11, 1; 54, 6. 
58 Aug., Enarr. in Ps. 64, 3. 
59 Cf. Aug., civ. Dei 10, 29; 22,12; 22, 26-8. 
60 Aug., civ. Dei. 12, 27. 
61 Plot., Enneads 3, 2, 13 cited in Aug., civ. Dei 10,14. 
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the natural fact that should represent the most salutary warning against any 
disharmony: «the human race is, more than any other species, at once social by nature 
and quarrelsome by perversion».62 
The dichotomy between the city of this world and the city of God does not arise 
in the Christian contempt for the materiality of existence and the following flight into a 
spiritual and eschatological realm. The type of fellowship that emerges between men is 
the fruit of a contingent movement of the will played out in the course of one’s 
personal life and history, according to a narrative, as Augustine has insisted from the 
very first page,63 of real and physical pilgrimage. «It is not by having flesh, which the 
devil does not have, but by living according to his own self, that is, according to man, 
that man has become like the devil».64 
 
4.  The uniqueness of the redemption operated by Christ 
The Augustinian discourse on the will and its implications in the fabric of 
history cannot be separated by the event, which made eternity a moment of time. 
Human history was in fact nothing else than «the stretch of time in which the new born 
oust the dying»,65 a great river slipping towards death, until the moment in which the 
language of God suddenly uncovered itself in the appearance of Christ among men, and 
poured meaning into at least a small part of this disquieting inanity: «The centuries of 
past history would have rolled by like empty jars, if Christ had not been foretold by 
 
62 Aug., civ Dei 12, 28 
63 Cf. Aug., civ. Dei 1. Preface (ed. Bettenson, 1): «I have taken up upon myself the task of defending the 
glorious City of God […]. I treat of it both as it exists in this world of time, a stranger (peregrina) among 
the ungodly, living by faith, and as it stands in the security of its everlasting seat». 
64 Aug., civ Dei 14, 3.  
65 Aug., civ Dei 16, 1. 
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means of them».66 Book XIV of the City of God concentrates upon the repercussions of 
this extraordinary event: 
 
Now the reign of death has held mankind in such utter subjection that they would all be driven 
headlong into that second death, which has no ending, as their well-deserved punishment, if some 
were not rescued from it by the undeserved grace of God.67 
 
It is in response to this unique event that, in every age, men’s lives have 
crystallized around two basic alternatives: the members of the civitas terrena who tend 
to regard the achievement of any good in society as sufficient in itself, and those of the 
same civitas who “long” for something different, namely the reestablishment of their 
relationship with the Creator from whom they have fallen apart, and the 
commencement of the city of God on earth.68  
 
Although there are many great peoples throughout the world, living under different customs in 
religion and morality and distinguished by a complex variety of languages, arms, and dress, it is 
still true that there have come into being only two main divisions, as we may call them, in human 
society: and we are justified in following the lead of our Scriptures69 and calling them two 
cities.70  
 
The need to resolve this fundamental tension and save one’s own identity as a 
citizen of heaven is the centre of gravity of the relationship between the two cities of 
this world. The theological foundations of such discourse are discussed in book XIV as 
 
66 Aug., Tract. in Io. 9,6. 
67 Aug., civ. Dei 14, 1.  
68 Cfr. Brown, Augustine of Hippo, 318-322.  
69 Cf. Eph. 2,19; Phil. 3,20. 
70 Aug., civ. Dei 14, 1.  
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Augustine articulates his point that the cause of sin and, thus, the manifestation of 
every evil in this world does not arise in the flesh, but in the soul.  
 
Our being weighed down is not the true nature and substance of our body but its corruption; and, 
therefore we do not wish to be stripped of it, but to be clothed with the immortality of the body. 
For then there will still be a body, but it will not be corruptible, and therefore not a burden.71  
 
The rehabilitation of physical reality through the event of the Incarnation 
guarantees liberation from the necessity to depart from the materiality of existence in 
order to purify the soul and achieve any spiritual or social good. Bodies are no longer 
the prison that Virgil depicts («Fiery is the force and celestial the source / of those 
seeds, to the extent they are not / by baleful bodies clogged nor by earthly limbs / and 
mortal members numbed»72), because man can freely choose the source of authority 
that governs his life. 
 
The fact is that man was created right, on condition that he should live by the standard of his 
Creator, not by his own, carrying out not his own will, but his creator’s. Falsehood consists in not 
living in the way for which he was created.73  
 
It is the character of the human will to determine the quality of any emotion, 
thus establishing the fundamental relationship that defines our life: «If the will is 
wrongly directed, the emotion will be wrong; if the will is right, the emotions will be 
not only blameless, but praiseworthy».74 It is not the materiality of existence, but the 
degrees of loves, according to which our life is ordained, to give shape to the relation 
 
71 Aug., civ. Dei 14, 3.  
72 Ver., Aen. 6, 733-734. 
73 Aug., civ. Dei 14, 4.  
74 Aug., civ. Dei 14, 6 
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between God and the goods enjoyed by created beings.75 Created things and human 
achievement are not to be despised as long as those members of the civitas peregrina 
maintain a firm and balance perspective on the orders of loves of which they are 
capable in their present state:  
 
I do not blame you; I do not criticize you, even if this life is what you love… You can love this 
life all you want, as long as you know what to choose. Let us therefore be able to choose our life, 
if we are capable of loving it.76  
 
“Ordinate in me caritatem” is the hymn that the Bride of Christ, the city of 
God, sings in this world.77  
The acknowledgment of such order does not come easily as we are all tempted, 
like the devil was, to wish no other source of goodness than ourselves.78 Pride is the 
attitude which arises from an omnipotent denial of dependence, which characterizes the 
earthly city of each man’s heart.79 Augustine suggests that the conversion from such 
perverted order of love, which causes man to enjoy created things as if they were his 
own, can only be attained through assimilation of human love into the canons of perfect 
love, i.e. divine charity. The reference to the scriptural passage in Io 21:15-17, where 
Christ asks Peter if he loves Him for three times, is the exemplum chosen by Augustine 
to point to the historical revolution that took place with the Incarnation. In the first two 
questions, Jesus uses the word diligere,80 but when He asks Peter whether or not he 
loved Him for the third time, he uses the word amare (amas me?). On the other hand, 
 
75 Aug., Tract. in Ep. Joh. 2,11: «Suppose brethren, a man should make a ring for his betrothed, and she 
should love the ring more wholeheartedly than the betrothed who made it for her… Certainly, let her love 
his gift: but, if she should say, ‘The ring is enough. I do not want to see his face again’ what would we 
say of her». 
76 Aug., Serm. 297, 4 and 8.  
77 Song of Songs 2.4, in Aug., civ. Dei 15, 22 and 29; cf. Aug., De doctr. Christ. 1, 27, 28.  
78 Aug., civ. Dei 12, 6. 
79 Aug., civ. Dei 15, 7. 
80 Aug., civ. Dei 14, 7: “Diligis me plus his?”. 
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Peter does not change the word used for replying to the triple interrogations, as he 
replies for three times Domine, tu scis quia amo te. Therefore, Augustine concludes 
that in scriptures there is no distinction between the sentiments of human love (amor) 
and charity (caritas) towards the Son of God.81 Far from exhibiting just a sample of 
subtle linguistic exegesis, Augustine is again trying to undermine the Platonist tension 
between a correct pursuit of wisdom – which is obtained through a purifying ascent 
from earthly concerns –  and the distractions of the body, which falls in love and 
remains trapped in the materiality of existence. This tension results, in fact, in a 
contempt for creation, which would make practically impossible the validation of the 
Christian message: an ordered relationship of love with the created world oriented by 
the gratitude towards the charitable love of the giver. On the contrary, Holy Scriptures 
do not make any distinction between the enjoyment of things according to their true 
nature (caritas) and the use of them according to human attachment (amor), as long as 
such human love is pursued in full awareness of its dependence. Through this, 
Augustine suggests a conceptual unity in which it is possible to re-articulate human 
amor in light of the divine caritas by means of a right application of the will.   
 
Thus in the earthly city its wise men who live by men’s standards have pursued the goods either 
of the body or of their own mind or of both. Or if any of them were able to know God, they “did 
not honour him as God, but they dwindled into futility in their thoughts and their senseless heart 
was darkened.”82 In the heavenly city, on the other hand, man’s only wisdom is the devotion 
which rightly worships the true God and looks for its reward in the fellowship of the saints, not 
only holy men but also holy angels, “so that God may be all in all”.83  
 
 
81 Aug., civ. Dei 14, 7.  
82 Rm. 1, 21-23 and 25. 
83 I Cor. 15, 28. Cf. Aug, civ. Dei 14, 28 for the whole passage.  
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In the course of human society, Augustine identifies a group of men who are 
aware of the call that the love of God, manifested through the Incarnation, addresses to 
them. Part of a substantially different civitas peregrina,84 these men are entrusted with 
the task of using of their life as the ground to retrieve the signs of their real heavenly 
citizenship. In this light, history becomes the locus of the struggle for the re-
appropriation of their real value and glory as brothers of heaven, which had been 
stripped away from them with Adam’s fall. For this reason, Peter Brown concludes his 
analysis of the City of God affirming that,  
 
far from being a book about flight from the world, it is a book whose recurrent theme is ‘our 
business within this common mortal life;’85 it is a book about being otherworldly in the world.86  
 
5. The Eucharistic origin of the just society.   
Book XIV maintains that it is only the mediation of Christ, in whose person the 
city of God is revealed, which can afford human beings to form a true commonwealth, 
a just society.87 Book XIX of the City of God is dedicated to the description of the new 
just society conceived by the union between the classical idea of justice and Christian 
revelation. It focuses particularly on the way in which the ‘Eucharistic’ origin of 
Augustine’s just society dialogues with customs and norms of the earthly city, by 
which it is embedded.  
At the outset of the book, Augustine stresses the importance of the public 
dimension of the City: «How could that City have made its first start, how could it have 
advanced along its course, how could it attain its appointed goal, if the life of the saints 
 
84 Cf. Aug., civ. Dei 18, 13: etiam ista peregrina. 
85 Aug., civ. Dei 15, 21.  
86 Brown, Augustine of Hippo, 324. 
87 On the transcendental nature of justice see, for example, Aug., En. in Ps. 61,21: respice ergo, 
transcende, vade illuc ubi smel locutus est dues; et ibi inveniens fontem iustitiae, ubi est fons vitae. 
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were not social»?88 The first distinctive trait of a Christian society is the 
“communionality” of Christ’s nature, which cures man’s ignorance, and enlightens the 
intellect over the pretensions to justice, which the soul manufactures and to which it 
obsessively clings. Only through Christ’s grace and companionship, the soul is enabled 
to heal its will, imitate Christ’s example, and live rightly.89 Augustine marks his 
position against the Pelagian arguments that human beings, by imitating Christ, can be 
fully just and avoid sin altogether.90 The perfect unity between God and man is only 
found in Christ and here lies the “mystery” (mysterium, sacramentum),91 by which 
human beings cannot attain any form of true communion unless they humbly 
acknowledge their complete dependence upon God’s direct intervention into their 
soul.92 This is the central theme of book XIX where Augustine articulates his 
theological point by way of showing its implications at the level of history and society.  
Analysing the life of mortals, Augustine sees them afflicted by two kinds of 
deaths: the physical death of the ones we love and the spiritual death of those who have 
fallen from faith or moral conflict, dying in their soul and leaving us in a deep sorrow 
of the heart.93 In this second case, men try in vein to restore a certain equilibrium 
waging wars to achieve a temporary state of peace under the dominion of some ruler:  
 
how could that happen, unless they [men] should consent to the peace of his [a ruler’s] dictation 
either through love or through fear? Thus pride is a perverted imitation of God. For pride hates a 
 
88 Aug., civ. Dei 19, 5 
89 R. Dodaro, Christ and the Just Society in the Thought of Augustine, Cambridge and New York 2004 
(Cambridge University Press), 72-79. 
90 Cf. Aug., civ. Dei 19, 4. 
91 See Aug., Ep., 187, 34. 
92 cf. Aug., civ. Dei 10, 29: Gratia Dei non potuit gratius commendari, quam ut ipse unicus Dei Filius in 
se incommutabiliter manens indueretur hominem et Spiritum dilectionis suae daret hominibus homine 
medio, qua ad illum ab hominibus veniretur, qui tam longe erat immortalis a mortalibus incommutabilis 
a commutabilibus, iustus ab impiis beatus a miseris. Et quia naturaliter indidit nobis, ut beati 
immortalesque esse cupiamus, manens beatus suscipiensque mortalem, ut nobis tribueret quod amamus, 
perpetiendo docuit contemnere quod timemus. 
93 Cf. Aug., civ. Dei 19, 5 and 8. 
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fellowship of equality under God and seeks to impose its own dominion on fellow men, in place 
of God’s rule.94  
 
Before this scenario, something revolutionary has happened: God intervened 
into the world, and instead of configuring Himself as yet another ruler of man’s soul, 
He willed that man participate of His nature, which is the supreme good, thus achieving 
that everlasting peace he strenuously fought for. Before this incomprehensible act of 
self-emptiness, «human beings can only understand God’s “desire” in a correct manner 
by believing that he wills their happiness».95 Jesus, «though in the form of God, did not 
deem equality with God something to be grasped at, but emptied himself and took on 
the form of a servant».96 Thus, Christ’s sacrifice contains the invisible sacrifice that 
Christians, as members of His body, offer to God when they recognize Him as the 
source of their virtue. This sacrifice of praise enables man to enjoy the earthly peace in 
the earthly city, pledge of that fellowship with the holy angels of the Heavenly City, 
whose everlasting peace «is a perfectly ordered and perfectly harmonious fellowship in 
the enjoyment of God, and a mutual fellowship in God».97 Christ’s ability to take upon 
himself the despair of the members of his body is matched by his capacity to transfer 
back to his members the virtues proper of Himself. This “wondrous exchange” (mira 
commutatio)98 creates the Augustinian model of just society: in it, all members may 
submit their intellect to divine direction and obey divine assistance freely, so as to walk 
by faith and view «all peace, of body or of soul, or of both, in relation to that peace 
 
94 Aug., civ. Dei 19,12 
95 Dodaro, Christ and the just society, 103; cf. Aug., civ. Dei 10, 6: opera vero misericordiae non ob aliud 
fiant, nisi ut a miseria liberemur ac per hoc ut beati simus. 
96 Phil. 2:7 
97 Cf. Aug., civ. Dei 19, 9-10. Here 19, 13.  
98 Cf. Aug., En. in Ps. 30, 2, 1, 3: “Verumtamen quia dignatus est assumere formam serui, et in ea nos 
vestire se, qui non est dedignatus assumere nos in se, non est dedignatus transfigurare nos in se, et loqui 
verbis nostris, ut et nos loqueremur verbis ipsius. Haec enim mira commutatio facta est, et divina sunt 
peracta commercia, mutatio rerum celebrata in hoc mundo a negotiatore caelesti.” 
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which exists between mortal man and immortal God».99 Christ’s work of justification 
becomes the «oration of the just society, of the church (vox ecclesiae), whereby Christ 
speaks through the suffering members of his body».100 The relation between the earthly 
and the heavenly city in this world is thus one of mutual awareness, in which the use of 
the earthly and temporal things is similar to that of a pilgrim in a foreign land. He uses 
them according to their natural laws, but places his hope into the eternal blessing to 
which Christ has destined them.  
While this Heavenly City is on pilgrimage in this world, she calls out citizens from all nations 
and so collects a society of aliens, speaking all languages. She takes no account of any difference 
in customs, laws and institutions, by which earthly peace is achieved and preserved – not that she 
annuls or abolishes any of those, rather, she maintains them and follows them.101  
 
 Approached in this way, customs, laws, and institutions do not obstacle the 
pledge of that perfect peace, which the holy angels enjoy in heaven, and which is 
gained every time that a good action is performed in relation to God and to a 
neighbour.  
 
If anyone accepts the present life in such a spirit that he uses it with the end in view of that other 
life on which he has set his heart with all his ardour and for which he hopes with all his 
confidence, such a man may without absurdity be called happy even now.102  
 
  For this reason, Augustine proposes an alternative definition of ‘people’ and 
‘commonwealth’ where the unifying element is no longer represented by an idealistic 
agreement about what is ‘right’, an agreement unattainable among mutable beings, but 
 
99 Aug., civ Dei 19,14.  
100 Dodaro, Christ and the just society, 107; cf. Aug., Ep. 140, 18: quid hic quaeris, humana infirmitas, 
vocem verbi, per quod facta sunt omnia? Audi potius vocem carnis, quae facta est inter omnia, quoniam 
‘verbum caro factum est et habitavi in nobis’ [Jh 1:14].  
101 Aug., civ. Dei 19, 17.  
102 Aug., civ. Dei 19, 20.  
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rather by the praise to the God who granted enlightenment of the intellect, healing of 
the will, and the pursuit of virtue through forgiveness of sins. Furthermore, by 
acknowledging the limit of human virtue, which can seek its perfection only in God, 
the pilgrim members of the City of God experience true justice by sharing with others 
the prayer for the forgiveness of sins, which  
 
is not effective for those whose “faith, without works, is dead”,103 but only for those whose “faith 
is put into action through love”.104 For such prayer is needed by righteous men because reason, 
even though is subjected to God, does not have complete command over the vices in this mortal 
state».105 
 
 Since human beings do not opt for virtue without a struggle against the effect 
of original sin, the main character of the just society, the city of God on earth, is 
penitential.106  
 
In this life, therefore, justice in each individual exists when God rules and man obeys, when the 
mind rules the body and reason governs the vices even when they rebel, either by subduing them 
or by resisting them, while from God himself favour is sought for good deeds and pardon for 
offences, and thanks are duly offered to him for benefits received.107  
 
 
103 Jas., 2,17. 
104 Gal., 5, 6. Cf. Aug., civ. Dei 19, 27: Pax autem nostra propria et hic est cum Deo per fidem et in 
aeternum erit cum illo per speciem. Sed hic sive illa communis sive nostra propria talis est pax, ut 
solacium miseriae sit potius quam beatitudinis gaudium. Ipsa quoque nostra iustitia, quamvis vera sit 
propter verum boni finem, ad quem refertur, tamen tanta est in hac vita, ut potius remissione peccatorum 
constet quam perfectione virtutum. Testis est oratio totius civitatis Dei, quae peregrinatur in terris. Per 
omnia quippe membra sua clamat ad Deum: ‘Dimitte nobis debita nostra, sicut et nos dimittimus 
debitoribus nostris’ (Mt 6:12). 
105 Aug., civ Dei 19, 27.  
106 Dodaro, Christ and the just society, 112. 
107 Aug., civ. Dei 19, 27: Hic itaque in unoquoque iustitia est, ut oboedienti Deus homini, animus corpori, 
ratio autem vitiis etiam repugnantibus imperet, vel subigendo vel resistendo, atque ut ab ipso Deo petatur 
et meritorum gratia et venia delictorum ac de acceptis bonis gratiarum actio persolvatur. 
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Against the classical view by which the source of virtue is reason as it 
converses primarily within itself, as when it draws inspiration from moral examples,108 
Augustine sees this dialogue as a conversation with Christ. As a result, human virtue is 
a product of a direct, divine mediation, not of human reason alone. Through the form of 
an earthly pilgrimage in the footsteps of the love of Christ, virtue can indeed be known 
and willed until its immovable and perfected state in Heaven.109   
 
6. Conclusion. 
Augustine’s metaphysics of conversion, displayed in books XII, XIV, and XIX 
of the City of God, presents man in his essentially relational and transcendental 
character, which is played out for good or for evil on the stage of world history. This 
connection between metaphysics and history allows for an alternative reading of the 
City of God, by which man’s spiritual life and its public and social dimensions escape 
dichotomist views and the confinement to a purely philosophical or religious discourse. 
Augustine’s vision of the sanctified human community extends beyond the realm of 
Christian rhetoric and fosters a conception of just society which is based on the free 
degree of association and configuration of man’s will to the Creator’s activity.  
For Augustine, the human value of studying history emerges as he seeks to 
describe the community God intends to establish among men. In particular, Augustine 
stresses that God’s community is one in which men are not called to unite according to 
their similar nature (naturae similitudine), but primarily according to their feeling of 
kingship (cognationis affectu) that may subvert the ordinary course of society. The 
Romans have mistakenly reduced this bondage to a self-referential attitude, which 
 
108 Cic., De Rep. 3, 28.  
109 Dodaro, Christ and the just society, 113. 
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identified the core of unity with themselves as Romans and with the boundaries of the 
Roman Empire, thus falling in the utopia of a real civitas peregrina.  
Through the analysis of history, Augustine points to the introduction of a new 
civitas peregrina, whose citizens are defined by a different perception of glory, one that 
is not self-referential and escape deterioration into greed and lust.  
In order to attain such citizenship, man needs to walk on a concrete path of 
conversion of his own will, which is illuminated and made possible by the wonder of 
the miracle of the Incarnation. To elucidate on this point, and reject once for all any 
insinuation that conversion might be a product of man’s own disposition, Augustine 
terminates the City of God with a book dedicated to miracles as the visible expression 
of the way in which the agency of the human will comes to be incorporated into a 
broader narrative of divine intelligibility.  
 
God who made the visible marvels of heaven and earth, of which man is a great one, does not 
disdain to work visible miracles in heaven and earth, by which he arouses the soul, hitherto 
preoccupied with visible things, to the worship of himself, the invisible God.110  
 
Augustine is particularly fascinated by those miracles that speak of God’s care 
for the body, which will be reconstituted at the moment of resurrection, no matter in 
how many pieces had been torn apart.111 Augustine believes it to be extremely 
important to make them well known throughout the Church as they draw a line in time 
with those earlier miracles read everywhere «to testify to that one supreme miracle of 
salvation, the miracle of Christ’s ascension into heaven in the flesh in which He rose 
from the dead».112  
 
110 Aug., civ. Dei 10,12.  
111 Cf. Aug., civ. Dei 22, 15-16.  
112 Aug., civ. Dei 22, 8.  
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Bringing to fulfilment his theology of sign, Augustine suggests that miracles are 
an invitation into a new vision of reality where wonder at the sight of creation and of 
man constitutes the first element for a correct application of the will in charity. The 
great miracle of Christ’s Incarnation, Resurrection and Ascension in the flesh, together 
with all the other instances of divine intervention into the world, reinvest men of the 
possibility to act in accordance with a renovated nature, performing those good works 
that can attain the earthly peace which is the pledge of that fellowship with the holy 
angels of Heaven. 
 
For all our good works, when they are understood as being his works, not ours, are then reckoned 
to us for the attainment of that Sabbath rest, in which we ourselves shall become that seventh 
day, when we have been replenished and restored by his blessing and his sanctification. 113 
 
Shaped by this new nature, man is bound to form a society that is 
‘eucharistically’ configured by Christ’s sacrificial love for His people. Consecrated as 
the Bride of Christ, the city of God on pilgrimage in this world becomes the first place 
to meet Christ in person, such is the unity of Head and Body in one conjugal flesh.114  
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113 Aug., civ. Dei 22, 30. 
114 Cf. M. Cameron, Christ meets Me Everywhere: Augustine’s Early Figurative Exegesis, Oxford and 
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ABSTRACT  
This paper explores Augustine’s ideal of just society, as developed in books XII, XIV 
and XIX of the City of God, and his rehabilitation of the notion of civitas peregrina. 
Bringing to maturity the classical notion of community (according to Aristotle and 
Cicero’s definitions), Augustine investigates how, in the Christian view, the different 
kinds of societies, which arise on earth, are dependent on the acceptance or refusal of 
the relation between man and his transcendental origin. This connection between 
metaphysics and history allows for an alternative reading of the City of God, by which 
man’s spiritual life and its public and social dimensions escape dichotomist views and 
the confinement to a purely philosophical or religious discourse.  
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